How to operationalize your airport's safety risk management (SRM) and safety assurance (SA) efforts.

 

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Written by Jason L Hamlett CM, ACE, GSP, CPI (4/04/2024
       Health and Safety Management Systems for Airports | Facebook

How to operationalize your airport's safety risk management (SRM) and safety assurance (SA) efforts.

As an active aviation professional, I have had the opportunity to network with my fellow peers who manage other North American airports. One of my friends and fellow operations managers, Joe Hennessey of Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport MSP, asked me an excellent question I would like to answer for the blog.

How did you operationalize your airport's safety risk management (SRM) and safety assurance efforts?

In essence, how do you assure your airport SMS is a living breathing system and not a check-the-box manual on someone’s shelf?

Disclaimer: The initial steps of SMS have to be addressed for this advice to be effective. Address leadership roles, policies, responsibilities, communication, training, and organizational culture first.

SRM has to be approached from both a known-hazard and an unknown-hazard perspective. What that means is that there will be specific hazards embedded in the nature of managing an airport's campus.

Some of these hazards will be unexclusive and affect every airport across the board. Only the hazard level will change depending on the complexity of the operation. A great example of this is wildlife activity. As long as there are birds in the air, there is a risk of an aircraft bird strike. For these known hazards, simply execute the five-step SRM process. This process should be documented and communicated to all levels. The hazards that you know exist are the low-hanging fruit. The hazards that you don’t know can be slightly more challenging. This is where SRM and SA support each other and share space inside their respective realms.

What I have found to be successful is to identify and embed a few SRM process triggers into the everyday processes of the organization. These triggers can be events or changes in the airport's operations that alert the SMS team to execute the SRM process. For example, construction on an airport terminal ramp that closes terminal gates. This will force the airline to temporarily plane and deplane passengers on the ramp. Because this is a new temporary way of loading and unloading, the airport should perform the assessment to ensure there are sufficient controls for each hazard. Each group of the airport organization must be familiar with the SRM process in relation to their specific job functions. Larger airports may have to train at least one member of each group who can execute the SRM process within their own team and supply the documentation to the safety office. SRM triggers can be proactive, reactive, or both. Other examples of SRM triggers include:

• Safety complaints from the anonymous portal (reactive)                                     
  
• Employee hazard recognition (reactive)
• Procurement of new vehicles, equipment, and tools (reactive and proactive)
• Findings from JHA’s (proactive)
• Construction pre-planning meetings (proactive)
• Changes to the ALP (proactive)
• Before and after inclement weather events (reactive and proactive)
• Findings from inspections (reactive)
• Findings from post-accident investigations (reactive)
• Employee injuries (reactive)

 When any of these triggers are identified at any level of the organization, the SRM process should be executed. The findings of the SRM should be shared with the accountable party for hazard mitigation decisions and implementation strategies. After completion of the SRM, be sure to follow the 4-step Deming cycle of continuous improvement. Communicate that the process was executed and its findings to the top boss, all the way to the lowest-level employee.

Operationalizing SA is approached slightly differently than SRM. I have found that SA is all about safety accountability at all levels. You cannot achieve SA unless you fill the gaps in safety accountability. Safety accountability starts at the top and is communicated down. Safety assurance starts at the bottom and is communicated. Every single worker, internal and external, has a role to play. The first level of safety assurance reporting typically starts with inspections performed by the crew foreman, individual supervisor, or site-specific safety representative. These individuals should be performing documented safety inspections of their respective areas of work. I have often heard that the safety office should be performing safety assurance inspections. This is only effective for small organizations with limited resources. 

For large operations, SA inspections are a team lift. For example, my home airports are over 16k acres, combined with almost never-ending construction in the spring and summer and snow removal activity in the winter and fall. If the only safety inspections were performed by a limited safety team, then many hazardous actions, behaviors, and conditions would be missed. Not to mention, the front-line levels of SA will be robbed of their ability to be accountable for the hazards that affect their work. Another level of safety assurance is achieved thru a robust audit schedule. In simple terms safety audits are examination of the reported information above and a physical check to assure what is being reported exist in the real world. I will write a separate piece on safety audits as they can be involved.

When documentation from the SRM process and SA inspections is collected, the documentation should be uploaded to a digital platform. The digital platform should have the ability to generate reports and metrics. Performing statistical inference on the raw data gives the accountable executive the ability to develop hypotheses from identified problems. This is a scientific approach to safety-based decision-making based on the findings from safety data.

As I have said in my previous writings, safety management systems (SMS) for airports are a tailor-made suit that cannot be bought off the rack. There has to be a high level of customization to the airport’s exact operational needs, culture, and hazards. Following this simple advice will assure you that you are on the right track to fully operationalizing your airport's SMS efforts.

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Runway Incursion Avoidance Series 2 - (Human Factors) Part 2

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Written by Jason L Hamlett CM, ACE, GSP, CPI (4/04/2024
Health and Safety Management Systems for Airports | Facebook

The “Dirty Dozen” of Airside Operations

Runway Incursion Avoidance Series 2 – (Human Factors) Part 2 is a continuation of part 1 focusing on the "Dirty Dozens" of airside operations.

The Dirty Dozen was derived in 1993 from Gordon Dupont’s role as Special Program Coordinator for Transport Canada. Mr. Dupont developed a safety workshop titled Human Performance in Aircraft Maintenance. In my contribution, I will apply Mr. Dupont’s 12 aircraft maintenance human factors to the air operations area (AOA) environment. I will also explain each dirty dozen factor and provide associated common errors, followed by an adequate control measure. The common error can be considered the "lead" into an undesirable event such as a runway incursion.

The Dirty Dozen of airside operations can be explained as 12 human factors that contribute to human errors in the AOA and associated movement area. By understanding each factor, airport managers, supervisors, and foreman can identify when attributes become out of balance and negatively affect airfield safety. For example, not giving enough time to complete a task, or too much pressure to complete a task on schedule can lead to a higher risk of surface incidents.

Pressure	Stress	Fatigue
Lack of Communication	Complacency	Lack of Knowledge
Distraction	Lack of Teamwork	Lack of Resources
Lack of Assertiveness	Lack of Awareness	Norms

Pressure: can be described as an internal or external force that is either real or perceived that demands

a higher-than-normal expectation of work performance. Stress can cause pressure on workers.  

Common Error: Unrealistic expectations, outcomes, and deadlines.

Example: An airport construction contractor has been procured to remove the post snow season over burden on the taxiway island shoulders. The time it takes to complete each grass island is 45 minutes and there are ten islands. A 30-minute closure is scheduled twice per day for a week. The work must be done by the end of the week so the shoulder can be repainted.

Control Measure: Perform a thorough assessment of the steps involved in completing a task and develop realistic completion goals. Prioritize each task in order of importance. Include workers in the assessment and decision-making process. 

Stress: can be described as an external tension that has a negative effect on our mental state.  The most

common types of stress airport workers experience on the AOA are acute and chronic. Acute stress occurs in the moment and is usually a product of the environment or situation. Responding to an airport alert class III can cause acute stress. Chronic stress builds over time and is a product of long-term factors that can affect both our work and home lives.

Common Error: Failure to assess the type of stress employees struggle with. Failure to provide support and stress relief opportunities for workers.

Example: An airport environmental worker was recently notified that his spouse was diagnosed with a terminal form of cancer. While taking water samples from the glycol retention ponds one of his co-workers notices he is moody, losing focus, and easily fatigued.

Control Measure: Develop an anonymous reporting system for workers who observe undesirable behaviors. Initiate internal programs that support workers challenging life situations. Provide access to activities that relieve stress at work (team exercises, exercise rooms). 

Fatigue: can be described as the body’s natural reaction to prolonged mental and physical activity. 

Common Error:  Failure to track, and set limits on worked hours, overtime, and time spent performing a specific task.

Example: The airport authority utilizes a contracted snow removal company to haul snow that is collected in the terminal areas. All of the drivers of the who haul the snow possess a CDL. Since the work is performed on private roads, the snow company does not consider any time spent freelance driving performing CDL work. Some drivers will be over the 16-hour limit before the end of the shift.

Control Measure: Track the time spent on the clock and performing tasks. For regulated work such as CDL truck drivers this is a matter of legal obligation. Rotate assignments and provide sufficient rest and break periods for the work being performed.

 

Lack of Communication: can be described as not providing the minimum amount of information

to safely complete a task. This can lead to a lack of knowledge.

Common Error: Failure to report field conditions and surface statuses to team members at shift change times.

Example: An airport operations dispatcher is five minutes away from the end of shift. The relief worker is usually on site prior to this time and ready to receive a pre shift briefing. Four minutes before shift change, a biz-jet slips off the taxiway and becomes stuck on the west side of the airfield. Since the dispatcher will now be late for a after work affair, the pre shift briefing is skipped.  

Control Measure: Exhaust all channels of communication available to pass along crucial information during shift changes. This can include dashboards, e-mails, SMS text, and etc.

 

Complacency: can be described as a situational feeling associated with performing routine tasks. Complacency has the opposite effect of stress. 

Common Error: Failure to rotate jobs assignments or performing a task the exact same way for extended periods of time.

Example: A construction safety supervisor performs the same sweeper escort 15 times per shift following the same route. While leading the sweeper machine down the taxiway the safety supervisor does not realize the airport is in a east west operation due to prevailing wind conditions. The construction supervisor inadvertently cuts off a 737 taxing to the gate.

Control Measure: Develop different procedures to perform the same task. Small changes to performing task can make all the difference in assuring workers remain alert. This includes inspections, escorts, surface re-opening procedures.

 

Lack of Knowledge: can be described as not being provided or possessing the required skills, information, and understanding to perform a specific task.

Common Error: Providing workers with incomplete, inadequate, or improper on the job training. Also hiring individual who do not meet the minimum experience and educational requirements.

Example: The senior VP of personnel has hired his family friend to manage the airport safety department. The individual comes from the process quality world and has limited occupational and airside safety experience. Due to a lack of understanding the manager does not respond promptly to employee safety complaints. The workers become frustrated and start to make complaints with OSHA and the FAA.  

Control Measure: Consistently perform training needs assessments and follow up as a form of continuous improvement. Only hire individuals who meet the minimum qualifications to perform sensitive job functions.

 

Distraction: can be described as anything that draws a worker’s attention away from the task at hand.

Common Error: Failure to remove noise generating devices from the cabs of vehicles and equipment.

Example: An airport operations specialist is performing the daily field inspection on the runway. The specialist has both the vehicles FM/AM radio and the FAA tower radio tuned to the proper frequency and the volume is turned up. While stopping to remove FOD the specialist does not hear the Tower controller request the vehicle exit the runway immediately and hold short at the nearest intersection. The specialist continues with the inspection.

Control Measure: Limit distractions by elimination, or substitution of all sources of unnecessary noise, and visual ques. This includes multiple radios channels, cell phones, and other media devices. Communication policies also help alleviate unnecessary noise in cabs of vehicles.

 

 Lack of Teamwork: can be described as a lack of cooperation between team members.

Common Error: Failure to foster team building and cooperation as a core organizational goal. Failure to abate a lack of trust between team members.

Example: Two airline wing walkers and one tug driver are pushing back an aircraft from the gate. Once in the alley way the wing walkers disconnect the aircraft and give the signal to taxi to the pilot. While transitioning across the zipper roadway the push back driver does not stop and wait for the wing walkers to transition the zipper. Traffic resumes and one of the wing walkers is struck by a tug.

Control Measure: Communicate each team members role, and responsibility, and successful outcome to all members of the team. Quickly resolve individual grievances and complaints.

 Lack of Resources: can be described as not possessing the tools and equipment to complete a job function successfully and safely. 

Common Error: Failure to repair or replace old tools, parts, and vehicles.

Example: A airport electrician reports to his foreman that the steering on in his work vehicle feels sloppy and is making weird noises. The foreman responds that its not a big deal and to get to work. While on the last 10 minutes of a scheduled runway closure, the vehicle breaks down on the centerline of the runway losing the front passenger wheel in the process. A tow truck has to escorted out to the runway and the reopening is delayed. 

Control Measure: Perform necessary inspections and promptly repair and replace damage found. Keep a inventory list of items and update stock as necessary.

 

Lack of Assertiveness: can be described as a worker’s inability to communicate vital information.

This can be tied to Lack of Communication and Lack of Teamwork.

Common Error: Failure to empower employees, or creating a situation where employees feel ignored or neglected.

Example: An airport safety manager identifies a risky work behavior by inhouse contractors who perform work in closed sections of the movement areas. The safety manager is told to stay in your lane by airfield management. The safety manager now ignores any risk observed on the AOA and exclusively focuses on non-airfield related tasks.  

Control Measure: Create a culture that invites feedback from all employees. Acknowledging those who have concerns wither invalid or accurate makes all team members fell included and a part of the team.

 

Lack of Awareness: can be described as a lack of key facts (information) that involve the completion of a project but are not necessarily directly related to a worker’s responsibilities. Not to be

confused with situational awareness which is dependent on understanding of the work environment. This can be caused by Lack of Assertiveness, Lack of Communication, and Lack of Teamwork.

Common Error: Fostering barriers to communication, or a lack of inclusion.

Example: Airside operations shift manager has been given the task of assisting a contractor with staging and setting up an airfield closure on midnights. The senior airside manager attended the planning meetings but did not give specific details of the planning meetings to the shift manager. While onsite the shift manager prohibits the contractor from taking actions that the senior manager approved. The closure and work are now delayed.

Control Measure: Create a culture of inclusion. Involve employees who have responsibilities in the project’s successful completion. It may be a good idea to have some of the lower-level employees participate in planning meetings, as they have insight on how the work is performed in the field.

 

Norms: can be described as “but we always did it this way”.

Common Error: Failure to continuously improve processes.

Example: An airport construction project manager is working with field maintenance managers and managers of the construction team. While closing portions of the movement area for renovations the project manager and maintenance manager agree to weigh down the low-profile barricades with sandbags. During a windy day one of the sandbags becomes open and the sand is ingested into the engines of a plane taxing near the construction area.

Control Measure: Initiate a review process for all work performed on the airfield starting with the tasks that are determined to be of the highest risk. Implement improvements and follow-up. Wash, rinse, repeat!! a higher-than-normal expectation of work performance. Stress can cause pressure on workers.  

Can you identify how the Dirty Dozen has negatively impacted your airport operation? If so, please share your experience!

Of the Dirty Dozen factors which do you think has the potential to create the highest level of risk?

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Runway Incursion Avoidance Series 2 – (Human Factors) Part 1

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Written by Jason L Hamlett CM, ACE, GSP, CPI  (6/23/2023)
Health and Safety Management Systems for Airports | Facebook

Runway Incursion Avoidance Series 2 – Human Factors (part 1) 👫👫

The airport movement area contains systems designed to prevent and lower the risk of runway incursions and aircraft ground collisions. Despite the sophistication and effectiveness of runway protection systems, runway safety data suggest a steady increase in surface events since the end of the Covid-19 Pandemic. This can be partially contributed to increased operations, however if the recent trends continue, incursions and surface incidents will soon surpass pre pandemic numbers. Runway incursion and airport surface incident statistics can be found here: Runway Safety Statistics (faa.gov) The human interaction with simple and complex systems, machines, processes, and environments has been identified as a direct cause and contributing factor to countless runway related accidents and incidents. In Series 2 we will explore the human aspect of runway incursion avoidance, and how this effects airport movement area safety.

What we heard about Human Factors 👂

Explaining the human aspect of safety in the Airport Operations Area AOA is no small task. Pilots, controllers, mechanics, ramp workers, fire fighters, police, security, field maintenance, airside operations, and construction workers, all perform their daily task on the movement and non-movement areas of the AOA. With an increase in airline service levels, an increased presence of aeronautical service providers exists on the AOA as well. Each employee no matter the classification and skill level, have specific tasks, procedures, and training exclusive to their organizational goals. Each classification also strives to attain the highest level of quality regarding safety and productivity. Despite these efforts and systems designed to manage safety efficiently, accidents, incidents, and near misses still occur on active runway surfaces.

The Federal Aviation Administration FAA defines Human Factors Safety as:

“A multidisciplinary effort to generate and compile information about human capabilities and limitations and apply that information to equipment, systems, facilities, procedures, jobs, environments, training, staffing, and personnel management for safe, comfortable, and effective human performance” (FAA Order 9550.8A).

Simply put, abating human factors errors encompasses the application of research from sciences, and engineering, to understand the characteristics and limitations of human workers as they interact with work systems.  The mental and physical capabilities of the human workers must be matched to all aspects of the job, or performance and safety will be negatively affected.

Scientific disciplines involved in human factors research that affect runway safety include physiology, phycology, kinesiology, and neuroscience. Scientist such as phycologist strive to apply their broad disciplines to better understand human behaviors and mental capacities. For example, a clinical phycologist will strive to identify the effects of medications, recreational drugs, and alcohol on how we think and make decisions. Human factors experts apply the research and findings from scientist to reduce safety risk. Engineers involved in runway incursion avoidance include safety, industrial, systems, and mechanical. Engineers develop tools and machines that increase human output and safety for a given job task or system interface. In contrast human factors experts examine the application of the tools and or machines developed by engineers from the human perspective to increase safety and efficiency.  Often the discipline of workplace Ergonomics can be mistaken and used as a catch all for the abatement of human injuries in the workplace. Although ergonomics does address the physical, cognitive, and organizational aspects of human interactions with work systems, ergonomics focuses more on efficiencies and risk to the individual, not all who operate within the system.  

Have a PEAR to better understand Human Factors 🍐

I’m not referring to a yummy piece of fruit. PEAR is an acronym that is used in the aviation industry to describe and better understand the application of human factors. PEAR stands for:

People

Environment

Actions

Resources

People: These are the individuals who perform work on the AOA. The demographics (age, sex, education level, physical abilities, mental capabilities, and etc.) of each individual must be equally considered as no one person is created equally to another. Have you considered the differences in personal communications between cultures? Human factors experts do. As mentioned above all aspects of the work and associated systems must be designed around the capacities and limitations of the people.

Environment: Environment ties into people as it represents the physical, social, and organizational environment the people work in. Runways are located outdoors, which is subject to extreme temperatures, noise, lighting, and darkness depending on where you live and the time of day. Most workers who access runway surfaces do so in some form of vehicle, be it a plane, tug, or car. The condition and use of the vehicle must be considered.  Organizational environment is directly related to the company’s safety culture and overall attitude towards working safe, just culture, accident investigations, and hazard abatement.

Actions: Actions include how well the employees are trained, certified, licensed, and made fully competent to execute the functions of the job task safely. Organizations who excel on actions keep excellent documentation of training, performance reviews, job hazard analysis JHA’s and job task analysis JTA’s. Tasks steps, sequence, communication standards, and quality of deliverables are all high priority items.

Resources: Resources tie into people, environment, and actions. Typically, resources can imply any item needed to complete a task. As mentioned earlier airport workers approach runway surfaces in vehicles. The vehicle can be both a working space (mobile office) and an organizational resource. The working space aspect will affect the employee’s environment. Does the AC work in the vehicle on hot summer days?   From the organizational standpoint the people performing a task are also a resource. According to the FAA, resources can best be measured by the amount of additional or less resources needed.

I have provided an overview of what the discipline of human factors is, and its relation to runway incursion avoidance. All too frequently airport safety managers fall back on lack of situational awareness as an incident cause. Same goes for airlines and the use of the term pilot error. With a strong understanding of what makes up human factors safety we can begin to explore further its application to avoiding runway incursions at airports.

Can you:

Determine how this knowledge can improve runway safety at your airport?

Think of any methods of identifying and controlling human factors errors for airport employees?

I look forward to hearing from you very soon!!!

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Runway Incursion Avoidance Series 1 (Airport HOT SPOTS)

 

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By Jason L Hamlett CM, ACE, GSP, CPI 06/08/2023

Airport SMS Facebook Group

Runway Incursion Avoidance – Airport HOT SPOTS

What we know about airport HOT SPOTS 🔥

An airport hot spot is defined as a physical location on an airport’s movement area known for being high risk for the potential of creating a runway incursion or ground collision. Most hot spots exist at runway intersections and exit points. Typically, hot spots are areas of complicated design and bad airport layout planning. Pilots and ground vehicle drivers should use elevated situational awareness when entering known hot spots.

How to identify an airport HOT SPOT 🔥

History is always the best teacher. At your home airport, data from past surface events, accidents, and near misses can be telling to where problem areas exist in the airport movement area. For this reason, data integrity and collection of surface events is critical for airport management. When visiting airports, hot spot locations can be found on the airports diagram chart supplement.  An example of this is provided as the attached picture. Aeronav also produces a list of known airport hots spots as published by the FAA. This can be found here: All_Hotspot.PDF (faa.gov). In 2022 the FAA undertook a hot spot standardization project. This effort standardized the symbols and verbiage used on airport diagram charts to be consistent and less confusing. Today only two symbols are used to identify hot spots, they are either a circle or a cylinder.

How to reduce the risk of HOT SPOTS 🧯

Heightened awareness, knowledge, reduced exposure, inclusion, and training are all excellent suggestions to reduce the risk of an accident at a hot spot. Heightened awareness can be maintained by staying vigilant and always knowing your exact location and destination while driving or operating in the movement area. Knowledge ties into heightened awareness from utilizing experience from airfield driving and having a through understanding of the complexity and challenges of your airport’s layout. When I was an operations specialist, the hairs on the back of my neck would stand up when I approached a intersection with multiple entrance and exit points. Knowing the size and type of aircraft that operate on the airfield helps as well. For example, if I observed an aircraft with a Delta logo, I could speculate where it would park and its path. If the plane were a heavy, it would most likely go to the heavy departure runway, or parking gate at the terminal. If it were a regional jet, it would most likely go to the regional terminal or secondary departure runway.  To reduce exposure, hot spots should be avoided by ground vehicle drivers when at all possible. This is accomplished by proper planning and the use of alternate routes such as access roads. Never cross a runway or taxiway to save time regardless of if its closed. Inclusion involves participating in inhouse discussion and asking questions when necessary. My home airport host FAA sponsored Runway Safety Action Team RSAT meetings bi-yearly. These forums are excellent in identifying and declassifying a movement area surface as a known hot spot.  Training is something airfield drivers and pilots are accustomed too. As a safety manager and aviation professional, I’m all for spending time and resources on training. I want to highlight here the quality of your airports training efforts. Make suggestions, and think outside the box to improve training and never allow your training sessions to become mundane.

As mentioned, know, and avoid airport hot spots whenever possible. Always use a heightened sense of vigilance when in the area of a known hot spot. This simple advice can make the difference in preventing a simple operation from becoming an accident investigation.

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